STOP

Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in
the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other
writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the
mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this
resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial
purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-
journal-content .

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people
discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching
platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit
organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please
contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS

A NEO-REALIST'S CONCEPTION OF GOD 1

Simon Alexander, professor of philosophy in the University of Man-
chester, has been recognized for some years as a leading exponent of the
"new realism" in England. His articles, which have been appearing
from time to time in Mind and in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society have attracted a good deal of attention in philosophical circles,
so that when it became known that he had worked out a new meta-
physical system along realistic lines, the publication of these Gifford
lectures was awaited with interest.

In the introduction to his metaphysical treatise Professor Alexander
indicates briefly his position with reference to the problem of knowledge.
Although bred, as he tells us, in the school of Bradley and Bosanquet,
he has reacted emphatically against even the revised version of absolute
idealism which these thinkers present. What he objects to, fundamen-
tally, in absolutism is its assertion that the parts of the world are not
ultimately real or true, that only the whole is true. Alexander's own
view is that minds and external things are co-ordinate members of the
real world, the act of mind and the object of the mind's awareness
being distinct existences united by the relation of "compresence," or
togetherness, in the experience. The mind's direct awareness of its own
mental state is denoted by the term "enjoyment," while "contempla-
tion" is the term reserved for the mind's awareness of objects. Every
object is, as an existence, independent of mind; it is selected for contem-
plation from the world of independent being. The object owes to mind
neither its qualities as known nor its existence, but only its being known.

Philosophy for Alexander is essentially metaphysics, defined as the
empirical study of the non-empirical, or in other words the science of
the a priori features of the actual world. It is the study of the pervasive
as opposed to the variable characters of experienced things. With this
conception of his task, he presents his material in four books: I. Space-
Time; II, The Categories; III, The Order and Problems of Empirical
Existence; and IV, Deity.

In its general features the system reminds one of Spinoza's, except
that instead of Space and Thought as the fundamental attributes of

1 Space, Time and Deity (The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918). S.
Alexander. London: Macmillan and Co., 1920. 2 vols, xvi+347 and xiii+437 pages.

92

BOOK REVIEWS 93

Being, all existences, mental as well as physical, are viewed as modifica-
tions of Space and Time. Space and Time, according to Alexander, are
in reality one; they are the same reality considered under different
attributes. In reply to the question, What do you mean by Space and
Time? Do you mean by it physical Space and Time, extension and
duration, or do you mean mental space and time, that which you experi-
ence in your mind ? The answer is that in the end both are one and the
same; what is contemplated as Space-Time is enjoyed as mental space-
time.

The categories, or pervasive characters of existent things, are " the
grey or neutral-colored canvas on which the bright colors of the universe
are embroidered." They are common to mind and to physical things,
but this does not mean that as present in the physical they are due to
mind; rather is it that they are fundamental properties of Space-Time,
of which both minds and physical things are modifications. The cate-
gories examined are Identity, Diversity, and Existence; Universal,
Particular, and Individual; Relation; Order; Substance, Causality,
Reciprocity, Quantity and Intensity; Whole and Parts, and Number;
Motion; the One and the Many. Quality and Change are not regarded
as categories, inasmuch as quality is simply a collective name for the
various specific and variable characters of things, while change is transi-
tion from one quality or variable empirical character to another.

In the third book interest centers in the discussion of mind and its
relations. The main levels of existence are motion, matter as mechanical,
matter with secondary qualities, life, and mind. When matter, which
is itself a complex of motions, attains to a certain degree of complexity,
colors, sounds, and other secondary qualities emerge. Life is an
emergent quality taken on by a certain complex of physico-chemical
processes belonging to the material level. Similarly mind, the last
empirical quality of finites that we know, is an emergent from the level
of living existence when it reaches a certain new complexity.

The doctrine of a parallel relation between the mental and the
neural is rejected on the ground that in reality they are not two, but one.
That which, as experienced from the inside, or enjoyed, is a conscious
process, is, as experienced from the outside, or contemplated, a neural
one. The mental process is physiological, and it would seem that it is
simply its locality which makes it mental instead of merely neural, although
its being mental means that a new feature, that of mind, has emerged.
However, while mental process is something new, a fresh creation, the
mind is itself identical with the totality of certain neural processes, only
not as contemplated, but as enjoyed. Different processes of consciousness

94 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

can belong to one mind simply because all the parts of the neural
structure are physically connected. Thus the entire weight of the
system before us is against belief in the continued existence of mind
after physical death. "Should the extension of mind beyond the limits
of the bodily life be verified," the author admits, "the larger part of the
present speculation will have to be seriously modified or abandoned."

Unlike the empirical qualities of external things, values, or tertiary
qualities, as Alexander calls them, imply the amalgamation of the
object with the human appreciation of it. What is true, good, or
beautiful, is not true or good or beautiful except as many minds through
conflict and co-operation have produced standards of approval or dis-
approval. Values are the creation of mind, but they are real characters
which real objects possess by virtue of their relations to minds, which
they satisfy. Pragmatism is criticized in these words:

All science is the unification of propositions of experience, and a proposi-
tion is true if it works with other propositions. Were the doctrine of
pragmatism nothing but an assertion of this fact it could hardly claim to be a
novelty. Its significance is that it maintains that there is nothing more to be
said of truth. So apprehensive is it of the doctrine that reality is a closed
system, fixed and eternal, into which all finites are absorbed and lose their
finite character in the supposed Absolute, that it dispenses with all inquiry
into the ultimate nature of reality. Reality is indeed no fixed thing, but being
temporal is evolving fresh types of existence. But truth which is not guided
by reality is not truth at all.

Appended to the discussion of values in general there is a protest
against the philosophical method which adopts value as the clue to the
nature of reality; to proceed thus, it is claimed, is to discolor the truth
with our affections. Now, while our general criticisms of the book are
reserved until the end of this review, a critical remark may be interjected
at this point. Illegitimate as it may be to assume that reality as a whole,
or fundamentally, is like what we appreciate, it does seem permissible
to ask what logically must be believed about reality if we are to maintain
without inconsistency that our critically examined and still assured
evaluations are valid. This method is not to be used to contradict
verified scientific results, but to supplement the necessary deficiencies of
scientific information. For example, if the consciousness of moral obliga-
tion is to be regarded as at all valid, man must be to some extent a cre-
ative determiner of his own conduct. Absolute determinism, which
scientific observation never has demonstrated and, we may be sure,
never will demonstrate, can be contradicted with moral certainty. It
is because he scorns to make use of such considerations in philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 95

that Alexander can subscribe to the unverified and unverifiable dogma
of strict determinism and assert that human freedom involves no fea-
ture save enjoyment which distinguishes it from natural or physical
action.

The fourth book begins with the question, In a universe consisting
of things which have developed within one matrix of Space-Time, what
room is there for God ? The answer given to this question is novel, even
startling. While mind or consciousness is the highest empirical qual-
ity which we know, deity, it is maintained, is the next higher empiri-
cal quality to the highest we know. Thus deity is not as yet; the
universe is engaged in bringing it to birth. Since knowledge depends on
experience we cannot tell what is the nature of deity, but we can be
certain that it is not mind. God, the being which possesses deity, must
be spiritual in the same way as he must be living and material and
spatio-temporal, but his deity is not spirit. Deity is to spirit as spirit
is to life, or as life to materiality. God is directly experienced in
the religious emotion of worship as something higher than ourselves;
but religious emotion cannot prove the existence of God. Only meta-
physics could do that, but as a matter of fact metaphysics does
not do that. God is, or rather would be, the whole world as possess-
ing the quality of deity. But as the quality of deity has not yet made
its appearance, the best we can say is that as an actual existent, God is
the infinite world with its striving toward deity. This is the God of the
religious consciousness. The world as possessing deity is not actual but
ideal. And so what is felt in religious experience is not the actual pres-
ence of God, but simply the vague future quality of deity.

All this to religious common sense is bizarre enough, but a further
most disconcerting qualification remains to be mentioned. Not only
does the individual sketched as the infinite God not exist; it is only in
this sense of straining toward deity that there ever can be an infinite
actual God. If the quality of deity were actually attained, we should
have not one infinite being possessing deity, but many (at least poten-
tially many) finite ones. And beyond these finite gods which are to make
up the next order of finite existence there will be in turn a new empirical
quality looming into view, which will be for the gods what deity is for us
spirits. Whether or not there are finite gods somewhere in the universe,
we may not know. If they do exist they must have material bodies and
life and mind as well as deity, and such beings are not recognizable by
us in any form of material existence known to us. Moreover, instead of
man's existence depending upon God, it may be surmised that the future
existence of deity and the gods depends very largely upon the efforts

96 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

of man. And finally, while deity must be supposed to be on the side
of goodness, since that which survives is good, God as the whole world
possessing (in the future) the quality of deity is neither good nor evil. It
includes both good and evil in the human minds which make up its body.
So much space and time have been devoted to an exposition of
Alexander's metaphysical system that little of either is left for evaluation.
A few brief comments only may be appended. First, a word of apprecia-
tion. Even one who differs widely from many of Professor Alexander's
conclusions can view with sympathy and some degree of satisfaction the
attempt to construct on an empirical foundation a comprehensive theory
of reality — particularly in these days when so many who bear the name
of philosophers would deny, in the name of a rather superficial instru-
mentalism, that there are any such problems as those with which the
theory of knowledge and the theory of reality deal. Nevertheless it
must be admitted that it is the metaphysical attempt without the satis-
factory completion of the task, as in the instance before us, that confounds
the philosopher. What Alexander has given us, viewed as a whole, is
little more than a singularly methodical and complete presentation of
an original and interesting but highly fantastic world-view. Reasonably
sober and scientific in the interpretation of experienced nature, when he
undertakes to anticipate the future course of evolution he makes progress
only through dogmatic assertion on the basis of arguments from analogy
which are more than doubtful. His weird speculations are the resultant
of perhaps three main factors: first, his rather wilful adherence to a very
extreme form of realistic monism, according to which mind is not to be
regarded as originating anything in the real world beyond the peculiar
relation of awareness which is its own inherent quality. Second, his
comparative indifference to certain spiritual values, making him willing
to give up any idea of an existent God or creative human freedom
or personal immortality; and finally, his passion for a neat and finished
system. This last characteristic may be good or bad according to
circumstances. If the philosophy is fundamentally sound, attention to
systematic unity will make it better. But if the philosophy is funda-
mentally unsound, consistency and system may lead the thinker to
conclusions ever further from the strait and narrow path of truth. Like
many another system-maker the author of Space, Time and Deity
seems much more eager to exhibit the curiosities of his really brilliant
speculative imagination than to seek that true and sober wisdom of
which the philosopher above all others is supposed to be the lover.
While metaphysical truth may indeed be discolored by the mistaken
appreciation of false values, is it not equally true that it may also be

BOOK REVIEWS 97

discolored by a failure to appreciate sufficiently certain values which,
after every fair critical test, still seem to be genuine and real ?

Douglas C. Macintosh
Yale Divinity School

A NEW EXPOSITION OF JOB 1

The original plan for the Book of Job in the "International Critical
Commentary" contemplated its being prepared by the late Professor
Driver. But death took him from the task February 26, 1914. In accord-
ance with his wishes, the completion was intrusted to Professor Gray, of
Mansfield College, Oxford. Professor Gray's fitness had already been
attested by his excellent commentaries on Numbers and on Isaiah,
chapters 1-27, in the same series. In this commentary on Job, the
work of each contributor is clearly indicated; the bulk of the gram-
matical, linguistic, and textual notes is the work of Driver, as is
also a large part of the new translation. The main commentary,
the translation of sixteen chapters, and the introduction are from
Gray. Gray's hand is seen also throughout the commentary and particu-
larly in the philological notes in the addition of bracketed material of great
value. It may safely be said that the unity of the work thus coming
from two authors is remarkable. Its value lies chiefly in its sound
scholarship and its splendidly balanced judgment. No strikingly new
points of view are revealed in either the textual criticism, the metrical
form, or the literary analysis. But we are given the reaction of two
level-headed scholars to most of the propositions regarding the interpre-
tation of Job that time has produced. This reaction is, on the whole,
conservative, as is fitting in a standard work like this. Whatsoever of
the newer and more radical views has found recognition by acceptance
here, may be regarded as having fairly earned its place. This commen-
tary is a record of the ground thus far possessed.

The origin of the Book of Job is placed in the fifth century B.C., with
allowance for the margin of a century either way. The main additions to
the original book are: (1) the Elihu speeches (chaps. 32-37); (2) the poem
on Wisdom (chap. 28), and a section of Yahweh's speech (chaps. 40:6 —
41:34), not to speak of glosses and minor additions scattered all along.
The unity of the Elihu speeches is unchallenged; and Dr. Gray declares

1 A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job, Together with a New
Translation [International Critical Commentary]. S. R. Driver and G. Buchanan
Gray.. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. 2 vols, xxviii+376 and 360
pages. $7.50.